Shenzhen Haimao, Mastel Makina, and Ishara Al Barq: how a shadow channel through China, Turkey, and Dubai armed Iranian Shaheds against the UAE

The correspondence also reveals that, should tests on the Ukrainian front prove successful, the Baku intermediary promised a lucrative contract to supply a batch of identical chips—pre-programmed in the Russian Federation—to Iran, allowing the Iranians to bypass EW systems in Dubai. In light of recent events in the Middle East, where the newest 107-series Iranian Shaheds managed to breach the UAE’s defenses and strike the major DXB airport as well as the upper floor of a Dubai Marina skyscraper, it is now much clearer why and how this occurred.

This further confirms the link between the terrorist attacks on Dubai’s infrastructure and the Iranian military. And while the Russian side denies all allegations of military supplies to Iran, including satellite intelligence, the facts suggest otherwise.

According to an investigation by our colleagues at The Insider, the scheme for importing cutting-edge Chinese anti-EW electronics for Iranian Shaheds functioned as follows:

The Chinese company Shenzhen Haimao Import and Export Co., Ltd (O/B Guangzhou HB General Trading Limited, Xiwan Road 149) shipped restricted Shahed electronics disguised as basic spare parts for combine harvesters or snowmobiles to its Turkish partner, Mastel Makina in Istanbul, a company specializing in the import and re-export of industrial machine tools and electronics.

The paradox and irony of the situation lie in the fact that the company ordering this electronics for the Iranian Shaheds was based—of all places—in Dubai!

UAE-registered Ishara Al Barq General Trading LLC, specifically Azerbaijani manager Jafar Zeynalov (born February 28, 1982), was, according to the correspondence, directly responsible for supplying these specific microchips to Tehran.

The Azerbaijani counterparty was Caspian Logistics & Freight Forwarding Services Ltd (O/B of GTA Enerji İnşaat Gıda Limited Şirketi | Original address: AZ1022, Baku, Karpich Str. 14/1), led by direct manager Shanlik Shukur and supervised by his patron, Tagiyev Togrul Maxmud Oglu.

The editorial team of the First Truth & Transparency Committee, together with Transparency International (The Global Anti-Corruption Organization), submitted an inquiry regarding this supply scheme to Jafar and his Iranian counterparty in Dubai (Ali Suleyman Adampira) at his business phone number +971 50 645 73 47. However, as of the time of publication, no response has been received.

Members of the organized group violating the sanctions regime on the import of military electronics:

• Fatih / Shanlik Shukurov (Moscow–Baku–Istanbul route)

• Ali Suleyman Adampira (Dubai–Tehran route)

• Hubert Lorenz / Jafar Zeynalov / Maalainine Salama (Shenzhen–Moscow–Dubai route)

Judging by the phone number used in the correspondence between the Azerbaijani and the Turkish supplier, the phone number +90 (501) 000 00 47 corresponds to the business number of "Mastel Makina."

The editorial team’s second inquiry to Shanlik / Fatih Shukur, sent to the phone number +90 (538) 000 00 97—which is also registered to Inoltra General Trading LLC with offices in Dubai and Zurich—likewise remained unanswered.

Shanlik Shukurov, who sometimes introduces himself as Fatih, has already been included in the sanction lists of Ukraine and the United Kingdom for participating in the illegal export of dual-use and military goods to the Russian Federation.

At the time of publication, we have not yet received a response to our inquiry to the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) regarding whether this is indeed the same person.

If this information is confirmed, the authorities of the UAE and neighboring Gulf monarchies will gain an additional leverage point in cooperating with the Ukrainian military to expand cutting-edge capabilities for producing anti-drone interceptors and advanced electronic warfare (EW) systems to suppress the navigation of next-generation lethal Shaheds.

As a reminder, following the visit of Ukrainian President V. Zelenskyy to the Gulf states, Qatar and the UAE signed a deal worth nearly a billion dollars with the Ukrainian defense industry to produce anti-drone interceptors and EW systems.

However, a considerable amount of time will pass from signing the contract to production, testing, and operational deployment in the Gulf states. In the meantime, Iranian Shaheds equipped with new electronics imported through "brotherly" Azerbaijan will continue to terrorize neighboring countries. This has already forced a halt in the transit of 20% of global oil trade and 30% of LNG, triggering a worldwide crisis in the petroleum products market. How long this will continue remains unknown.

Adding to the irony of the situation, Azerbaijan itself recently suffered a successful strike by an Iranian attack Shahed on the airport in the city of Nakhchivan. Now it becomes clear how the Iranian hunter-killer drone was able to bypass the new air defense systems recently purchased from Turkey.

The joint agreement on military cooperation and information sharing between the Ministries of Defense of Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as the recent STRATCOM 2026 agreement in Istanbul, also look ridiculous in retrospect.

In short, the age-old struggle between the shell and the armor continues…

Ashley Miller

Business & Markets Reporter